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In the late afternoon o f 4 March 1762 the British war fleet left the port 
o f Spithead near Portsmouth with the order to attack and conquer “the 
Havanah”, Spain’s main port in the Caribbean. The decision for the 
conquest was taken after the new Spanish King, Charles III, had signed 
the Bourbon family pact with France in the summer of 1761. George III 
declared war on Spain on 2 January of the following year. The initiative 
for the campaign against Havana had been promoted by the British 
Prime Minister William Pitt, the idea, however, was not new.
During the “long eighteenth century” from the Glorious Revolution 
to the end of the Napoleonic era Great Britain was in war during 87 out 
o f 127 years. Europe’s history stood under the sign of Britain’s aggres­
sion and determined struggle for hegemony. The main enemy was 
France, but Spain became her major ally, after the Bourbons had 
obtained the Spanish Crown in the War of the Spanish Succession. It 
was in this period, that America became an arena for the conflict 
between Spain, France and England for the political leadership in 
Europe and economic predominance in the colonial markets. In this 
conflict, Cuba played a decisive role due to its geographic location and 
commercial significance. To the Spaniards, the island was the “key of 
the Indies”, which served as the entry to their mainland colonies with 
their rich resources of precious metals and as the meeting-point for the 
Spanish homeward-bound fleet. The British were always aware of 
Cuba’s strategic importance, and throughout the eighteenth century the
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island was often programmatically referred to as the “Gibraltar of the 
W est” (Callahan 1899: 42) and the “Shield of the West Indies” .
In spite o f Admiral Vernon’s failure to conquer Cartagena de Indias, 
Spain’s main port in the Tierra Firme, in 1740, Britain’s plan to break 
open Spain’s trade system was not discarded. Only a year later, Sir 
Charles Knowles, Admiral of H. M .’s fleet and later governor of Ja­
maica, presented a plan to take Havana, in order to control all com­
mercial activities in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean. “We 
should then command the whole West-Indies, and I may venture to add, 
carry on what trade we pleased to every post in it”, Knowles stated in 
his Description o f Havana.2
Twenty Years later, the plan was put into practice. The British 
started the siege o f Havana in June 1762. The campaign was the largest 
combined operation o f the Seven Years War, the attacking forces 
consisting o f more than 15.000 men from both sides o f the Atlantic, 
from England and her North American and West Indian colonies. The 
capture of Cuba’s capital nearly failed completely because the siege 
took much longer than expected and the tropical climate had weakened 
and even decimated by disease a considerable number of the troops. 
After six weeks of siege the British Army fought more against the 
climate and time than against the Spaniards. When Havana capitulated 
the British forces had lost 3,000 men (Blanck 1962: 92-93). During the 
next months another 2,400 soldiers died, most of them of illnesses and 
3,300 more fell sick.3 The belated and unexpected arrival o f nearly 
3,200 North American provincials from New York at the end of July 
was the turning point o f the siege. Although large numbers o f these 
troops also succumbed to the climate,4 the final conquest of the strategic 
centre piece o f Havana’s fortifications, the Castle El Morro, could be
2 D escription o f  the H avannah by the Sea C oast for a league or two to the Eastw ard
and as far as to the W estw ard m ay possib ly  prove useful if  ever it should be judged
proper to attack that place and w ar breaking out w ith Spain (BL, A dd M s 23.678, 
R em arks on the Siege o f  H avana, fol. 1 -9).
3 PRO , AD M  1/237.
4 BL, Egerton Papers 520, fol. 323-327.
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achieved shortly after.5 Once the Morro was in British hands, it took 
only six hours to conquer the rest o f the town.6
During ten months British and North American forces held Cuba’s 
capital until it was returned to Spain in exchange for the Floridas in the 
peace treaty signed in Paris on 10 February 1763. During this period 
strong commercial links between Cuba and the main ports o f the 
British-dominated Atlantic World were established: British and North 
American merchants streamed into Havana and began trading directly 
with Liverpool, Bristol and London, as well as with New York, Balti­
more, Philadelphia and Charleston. Cuba’s most important products, 
sugar and coffee, were exchanged for slaves from West Africa and flour 
from North America transported by English and North American 
vessels.
Most specialists on Cuba’s history have affirmed7 that the capture 
of Havana represented the watershed in the island’s political and eco­
nomic development, as the foundations were thereby laid for the trans­
formation o f Cuba’s economy into a monoculture based on sugar culti­
vation. In order to assess this interpretation’s validity one must define 
the political, economic and social consequences that arose after 1763. 
Such an attempt will be made here. Consequently, this article deals 
mainly with determining the role of the commercial interrelations be­
5 D avid Syrett points out that the heavy losses o f  the B ritish A rm y had a later im pact 
on the situation in the N orth  A m ercian colonies, for Pontiac’s R ebellion o f  1763 
could not be suppressed im m ediately, “because a large part o f  the A rm y w as still 
suffering from  deseases contracted at H avana” (Syrett 1970: xxxv). The follow ing 
reorganisation  o f  the British A rm y in A m erica turned out to be a reinforcem ent o f  
B rita in ’s m ilitary  pow er in the colonies and was felt as a  provocation  w hich 
eventually  contributed to the outbreak o f  the A m erican Revolution.
6 “ [...] On the 11th o f  A ugust about daybreak our batteries on La C abaña o f  44  guns 
and 8 m ortars opened against the tow n, and in six hours silenced its fire, m ade 
several breaches in La Punta, destroyed the defences, d isabled m ost o f  the guns in 
the north bastion  and harbour flanks, and acquired such a superiority  as obliged the 
besieged to propose term s o f  capitulation, w hich w ere signed the 13th, and full 
possession w as taken o f  the city  on the 14th [A ugust]” ; L ieutenant-G eneral D avid 
D un d as’s M em orandum  on the C apture o f  Havana. Parts o f  the m anuscrip t w ere 
published by  Syrett (1970: 315-26).
7 A im es (1907/1967), D onnan (1931, II: xlvi), G uiteras (1932), Foner (1 9 6 2 ,1: 42), 
and lately Pérez (1988: 56-57) and O ostindie (1992: 375).
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tween foreign merchants and local entrepreneurs in Havana. The signif­
icance o f Anglo-American merchants and slave-traders will be put into 
the context o f Cuba’s history during the second half o f the eighteenth 
century. Furthermore, the politics of the Spanish Crown concerning 
Cuba before and after the occupation will be examined.
For a short while after its occupation Havana was no longer the 
supplying port o f Spain’s monopolistic trade system but seemed to turn 
into a prosperous center o f commerce withm the Atlantic world market 
controlled by the British. There is no doubt that temporarily economic, 
social and even cultural interaction existed between Cuban creoles and 
British traders, who as a result of the Industrial Revolution sought to 
conquer new markets beyond the borders o f the Empire and especially 
across the Atlantic. In Havana the demand for the slaves that were 
indispensable to the planters’ ambitious plans to amplify Cuba’s sugar 
production was met by these merchants as intermediaries and suppliers 
o f the necessary working power. Very soon these months were referred 
to as the prosperidad británica, during which the influence and power 
o f the local elites grew considerably.
Nevertheless, Cuba’s economic history did not start with the arrival 
of the British. It therefore seems necessary to examine the decades 
before the British occupation in order to find out if  the capture of 
Havana was indeed the turning point as so often has been argued.
The importance of the port town as a “crucial component o f Euro­
pean expansion” and “fulcrum for European activity” (Liss/Knight 
1991: 1) was evident even before the capture o f Havana by the British. 
During the early colonial period Cuba served as a provisioning colony 
within the Habsburgs’ overseas empire. As early as in the middle of 
the 17th century the providing sector of the Cuban economy was 
strengthened by promoting agriculture, cattle breeding and the ship­
building industry in the Havana-area (Le Riverend 1972: 111). This 
slow process o f economic transformation was accelerated by monopo­
lising and reducing the cultivation o f tobacco (1717) in order to aug­
ment the production of sugar. The Royal Decree of 8 August 1739 laid 
the control o f the tobacco industry into the hands of the state-run 
Real Compañía de La Habana. Between 1740 and 1758 the produc­
tion jumped from 2,000 to 5,500 tons (Moreno Fraginals 1978, I: 19), 
whereas the tobacco export declined drammatically from 100,000 arro-
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bas (1 arroba = 11.5 kg) in 1738 to 78,106 arrobas in 1740 and only 
40,814 in 1761 (McNeill 1985: 269; Kuethe 1991: 29). During the brief 
period between 1754 and 1760 Cuban sugar-exports to Cádiz had nearly 
quadrupled from 108,402 arrobas to 378,346 arrobas. By 1760 the 
promotion o f sugar had become the “first priority in Cuban affairs” 
(McNeill 1985: 130).
Already by the 1730s Havana’s planter class had pushed through an 
important reduction o f export taxes on Cuba’s main products, in order 
to facilitate the Island’s participation in the competitive Caribbean 
market.8 In spite of the depression caused by the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
(1739-48), by 1760 legal commerce had increased 34% compared to the 
first two decades after the Peace of Utrecht (McNeill 1985: 190). Com­
mercial interchange intensified especially with the New Spanish empo- 
ria Mexico City, Veracruz and Campeche, but also with ports on the 
South American mainland such as Cartagena de Indias, Santa Marta, 
Maracaibo, Caracas, Trinidad and Portobelo (which was connected with 
Guayaquil and Lima). Even more important were the links with Spain, 
after the old system of the convoy fleet had been replaced by indi­
vidually registered merchant ships. Although far from a cosmopolitan 
trade centre, Havana had become the clearing house o f Spain’s 
comercio con las Indias, its production had grown steadily, and capital 
had been accumulated. The Crown cooperated with the planters and 
merchants in response to the market boom.This shift in the Cuban 
economy was a result o f the Spanish politics which had acted on the 
demands of Cuba’s lobby of agricultural producers and merchants since 
the middle of the century. The birth of Cuba’s ‘sacarocracia’ preceded 
the British domination.
Therefore, the importance of the British interlude lies in having 
accelerated and catalysed an ongoing process. As main factor within 
this process for the prospective economic development, the commercial 
links with the British and later North American merchants, especially 
the slave trade, need to be stressed: “ [...] los ingleses rompieron en sólo 
un año el equilibrio productor cubano y aceleraron el tránsito hacia la 
plantación” (Moreno Fraginals 1978, I: 36). After Havana had been
Im port taxes w ere lowered from  25%  to 5%  and sale taxes (millones) from  45 rea- 
les/arroba to 3 reales/arroba (M cNeill 1985: 128).
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returned to Spain, its creole oligarchy sought to increase the production 
o f its most lucrative goods and hence demanded more economic 
freedom. The Spanish Crown conceded them. The slave trade increased 
dramatically during the next decades as a result of the reforms estab­
lished by the Crown in order to boost the colonial economy. This trade 
remained a monopoly -  given once more to the very same entrepreneurs 
as before: the British slave traders.
Cuban Trade with Britain during the Occupation
After the peace of Utrecht in 1714 the British South Sea Company was 
given permission to establish trading posts in Cartagena de Indias, Vera 
Cruz, Buenos Aires, Panama, Portobelo, Caracas and Havana.9 It was 
the first time that Cuban merchants acted as legal agents of British 
traders, but the results were not satisfactory10 and legal trade remained 
an exception. During the decades before the events o f 1762, commercial 
links between Spanish Cuban and British subjects existed mainly on an 
illegal basis. As everywhere else in the Spanish colonial empire, smugg­
ling flourished, but especially in the Caribbean, the most active area of 
inter- and intracontinental trade.
When the English took Havana they found a large quantity of rotting 
sugar in the port of Havana awaiting its transport to Spain. Meanwhile, 
in Europe sugar-prices had increased due to the irregular supply from 
the Caribbean Sugar Islands during the war (Moreno Fraginals 1978,1: 
19). The habaneros must have been impressed by the quick solution of 
their problems, as the new merchants managed to immediately transport 
the goods to Europe and import considerable quantities of slaves and 
merchandise. Therefore, one should not underestimate the psychological
9 M inutes o f  the C ourt o f  D irectors, South Sea C om pany, London, 28 O ctober 1713 
(see D onnan 1930/31, II: 168-169).
10 W ithin the hierarchy o f  these trading posts H avana was o f  secondary im portance. 
From  O ctober 1716 to A ugust 1717 Jam aican slave-traders transported 648 slaves 
to Portobelo, 376 to C artagena and only 130 slaves to H avana (A ccount o f  N egroes 
from  Jam aica to  the Spanish W est Indies, South Sea C om pany, 1717 (D onnan 
1930/31,11:212).
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importance o f Havana’s brief encounter with England’s merchant class. 
Cooperation with the ingleses became intense, and only a small fraction 
o f Spanish loyalists removed to the interior.
A group of 20 to 25 British and North American merchants estab­
lished close commercial relations with Havana’s population. Apart from 
slaves, manufactured goods and textiles were sold in exchange for 
Cuban sugar, tobacco, coffee and hides. The British merchants in 
Havana were exclusively private entrepreneurs, who worked either as 
commissioners for merchant houses in London or Bristol, or maintained 
commercial ties with partners of equal status in Britain and Jamaica. 
Since the second half of the eighteenth century these private merchants 
had achieved the control of the Atlantic slave trade by suppressing the 
influence o f the state-run African Company." Independent traders 
replaced the monopoly companies.
One o f these merchants, the Liverpudlian John Kennion,12 resident 
in Kingston (Jamaica) and a participant in the Havana campaign, ac­
quired the monopoly for the slave trade in the British controlled part of 
North Cuba by a concession of Lord Albemarle, the commander-in- 
chief of the expedition and newly appointed gobernador of Havana.13 
According to this concession, the number of slaves to be introduced 
could not exceed 2,000.14 During the campaign Kennion held the
11 D onnan (1930/31, II: XLI) m entions the petition o f  the m erchant Sam uel Touchet, 
one o f  the first private  entrepreneurs from  L ondon w ho tried to break the state 
m onopoly  o f  the A frican C om pany after Senegal had been taken from  France in 
1758. Touchet w as later active in the trade w ith H avana during and after the B ritish 
occupation. In 1764 he signed a “M em orandum  o f  m erchants concerned in the 
trade w ith H avana” w ho tried to recover their debts and effects after H avana w as 
returned to Spain (see note 21).
12 K ennion had experience in the trade with Havana. In 1752 he jo ined  in a partner­
ship o f  B ritish slave traders who sent 88 vessels from  Liverpool to A frica in order
to transport a  total o f  24,730 slaves to Cuba (D onnan 1930/31, II: 496-498).
13 The m onopoly  concession was signed in O ctober 1762 (BL, A dd M s 38.201, 
fol. 301, as an appendix quoted in T hom as (1971: 1530).
14 “N egro slaves are w anted to support the annual decrease o f  this island and to
m aintain the plantation and settlem ent in the same w ay and tradition as they w ere
before  ([...]) to p reven t m any  ev ils  and abuses that w ould  arise from  an 
unrestrained im portation it is absolutely necessary to lim it the num ber anually  to  be 
in troduced” (BL, Add Ms 38.201, Liverpool Papers, Lord C om m issioner o f  the 
T reasury, fol. 299).
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contract for the victualling of the British fleet. He had bought a sugar 
plantation in Jamaica in the 1750s, and between 1748 and 1758 he had 
sent several ships from Liverpool to the West Indies, some of them 
in partnership with Samuel Touchet, a British merchant o f Havana 
(Thomas 1971: 3).
Havana was surrendered according to the capitulation by the town 
council (cabildo). Inventories of artillery, ammunition, public property, 
warehouses and ships in the harbour o f Havana were drawn up and 
assigned to the victor. The Spanish system of colonial administration 
was retained while Havana formally was incorporated in the British 
empire (Guiteras 1962: 97). Lord Albemarle became g o bernador  and 
capitán  g en era l  and reconstituted the cabildo, whose members were 
chosen from the town’s patriciate, mostly sugar planters, tobacco 
vegueros  and cattle breeders.15 On 8 August 1762 the cab ildo  swore 
obedience to the King of Great Britain; Sebastián de Peñalver, a mem­
ber of the cabildo , was appointed deputy (ten ien te) of the g o b ern a d o r. 
The Catholic Church retained its predominance and the Bishop of Cuba 
kept his rights and privileges. The tobacco monopoly passed into the 
hands o f the King o f Great Britain. Havana was declared a neutral port16
15 The cabildo continued their w ork in the sam e w ay as before and the functions o f  
the different offices did not change. T here w ere tw o alcaldes (m agistrates), an 
alguacil mayor (ch ief constable), a corredor mayor (postm aster), two receptores de 
penas de cámara (receiver o f  fines), an alférez mayor (herald), three regidores 
(alderm en), a síndico procurador (attorney-general), a depositario general (public 
trustee) and an escribano (secretary). Cf. Libro de C avildos del tiem po que la 
N ación Y nglesa dom inó a esta ciudad el año 1762-63, 15 A ugust 1762, AO H, lib. 
30. N early all these individuals belonged to H avana’s elite before, during  and after 
the B ritish occupation. The Spanish crown acknow ledged the necessity o f  coopera­
tion with H avana’s social and econom ic elite and therefore refrained from  accusing 
or punishing them  for their presum ed conspiracy w ith the ingleses. It w as the first 
sign o f  the will for reform  on part o f  the Bourbons after 1763.
16 “En consideración a que este Puerto se halla  situado oportunam ente para alivio de 
los que navegan a esta  parte de Am erica tanto española com o Inglesa sera reputado 
para los vasallos de S. M. C. [Su M agestad  C atólica] com o Puerto neutral, y les 
sera perm itido entrar y  salir librem ente, tom ar los refrescos que nezesitasen y  repa­
rar sus em barcaciones pagando todo por los precios corrientes, y no podran  ser 
insultados ni perturbados en su navegación por las em barcaciones de S. M. B. [Su 
M agesta Británica] ni de sus vasallos y aliados desde los cavos de Catoche en la 
costa de C am peche de San A ntonio al O este de esta Y sla y de la T ortuga hasta este
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in order to permit Spanish merchant vessels to land in Havana for 
refreshments, supply o f water or in case of sea average. Finally, the 
property o f merchants from Cádiz was delivered to its owners.17
On 24 December 1762 Albemarle established the regulations for 
opening the Port of Havana.18 All merchant vessels had to be registered 
at the duty office near La Punta, where landing permits had to be 
presented, entries of goods were controlled by Her M ajesty’s custom 
officers and duties were paid. Illegal merchandise were to be confis­
cated and sold in auction. A “Collector of His M ajesty’s Customs in 
Havanah” was appointed in order to guarantee that the taxes levied by 
the Spanish Government were “continued upon the same footing”.19 The 
lists of the Spanish collectors of customs from 1749-60 were revised in 
order to obtain the average amount of duties paid.20 But in reality the 
high export and import taxes of the Spanish, the almojarifazgo, avería 
and alcabala, were abolished: “Goods ship’d for Europe paid no Duty”. 
Instead, an extra duty on imported slaves was introduced by Lord 
Albemarle, but turned out to be illegal as it was not imposed according 
to Spanish law. One year after the restitution o f Havana, two law 
officers decided that it did not comply with the capitulation to impose 
duties on goods imported into the conquered territory and that mer­
chants were entitled to recover the money.21 Albemarle had to return
Puerto, y  desde el hasta ponerse en la altura de 33 grados N orte hasta que am bas 
M agestades catholica y B ritánica acuerden otra cosa” (A O H , lib. 30, fol. 8).
17 “Los caudales que se hallan detenidos en esta ciudad pertenecientes a  com erciantes 
de C ádiz de los Registros que han ido llegando en que son interesadas todas las 
naciones de a  E uropa se les facilite a los M aestres encargados de ellos el Passaporte 
corresp.te para hazer librem ente su reunión con dichos R egistros sin el riesgo de 
ser insultados en su v iage” (AO H, lib. 30, fol. 10vto-l Ir).
18 BL, A dd M s 38.201, Liverpool Papers, fol. 294-95 and PRO, CO 117/1, fol. 254- 
255.
19 A lbem arle to W illiam  Keppel, Second com m ander o f  the landing forces (14 M ay 
1764), BL, A dd M s 38.201, L iverpool Papers, fol. 301-303 and A dd M s 36.223.
20 BL, A dd M s 45.928, K eppel Papers, fol. 1 -68. See also: Branches under the charge 
o f  the Royal Officers o f  the H avana (BL, Add M s 38.201, L iverpool Papers, fol. 
304-308 and PRO , CO 117/1, fol. 262-265).
21 “ [...] w e apprehend that the extension o f  the duties to his M aj.s subjects and 
com m odities imported into the H avannah by them  cannot be supported in poin t o f  
law; because i f  they are to be considered w ith regard to H is M aj.s subjects as
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considerable sums to the merchants. But after the British occupation 
new problems arose from the question of payable duties. British mer­
chants that had traded with Havana asked for passports, vessels and a 
convoy from the Secretary of State, the Earl of Halifax, in order to to 
recover their goods from Havana.22 Spain permitted only one single 
convoy to reimport the British goods according to the peace treaty.23 
But John Kennion, an expert on these matters, assumed that the Real 
Compañía de la Habana had forced the Governor to inhibit the sale of 
their goods to the Spanish inhabitants by imposing duties on them.24As
original duties im ported by  the Royal authority  delegated to Lord A lbem arle, we 
think that his com m ission does not w arrant the exercise o f  such pow ers; i f  they are 
considered as the ([...]) Spanish Laws established in the Island o f  C uba and as 
operating upon HM  subjects im porting com m odities there, w e hum bly conceive 
that by  the Law s o f  E ngland a country conquered by his HM  arm s rem ains under 
the governm ent o f  its own laws ([...]) by  the articles o f  capitulation upon the 
R eduction o f  the H avannah it was stipulated that the inhabitants should be 
governed in HM  N am e by the same laws and under the sam e conditions to w hich 
they  had been subject when under the dom inion o f  Spain. Y et that law  o f  the 
Spanish G overnm ent could not operate upon HM  subjects im porting com m odities 
there and no t by the authority  o f  those law s bu t under the protection o f  an English 
G overnor. N or that duties could be collected upon the English subjects by  force o f  
Spanish law s appropriated as we conceive solely to the subjects o f  Spain and 
in exclusion o f  Foreign nations. N or that HM  subjects i f  they had w ithheld  such 
duties so dem anded for goods w hich they had im ported could have been exposed 
to the arbitrary m ode o f  collection that m ight have been exercised by the power o f  
the form er governm ent upon the subjects o f  Spain” (Lord C om m issioner o f  His 
M ’s T reasury, F. N orton and W. D elysley, A ttorney & Solicitor General, 14 M ay 
1764, BL, A dd M s 36.223, fol. 424-425).
22 M em orial o f  B ritish M erchants to the Earl o f  Halifax, 17 N ovem ber 1763 (PRO, 
CO 117/1 fol. 295). The M em orial was signed by the m ost im portant m erchants in 
the H avana trade: Sam uel Touchet, John K ennion, A lexander & R obert Grant, 
Charles O gilvie, Jam es Christie, M altby &  Dyers, A lexander A nderson, and D avid­
son, W illiam  W right & Co., John Gregg, H utchinson & M ure, R ichard A tkinson, 
W illiam  Bond.
23 G rim aldi to R ochefort, 4 M arch 1764 (PRO, SP 94/166, fol. 136).
24 “T hey im agine that num ber o f  vessels absolutely necessary as they have advices 
that the G overnor o f  H avana had taken every possible m easure o f  to obstruct the 
Sale o f  B ritish M erchandise to  the Spanish Inhabitants in Cuba, being urged to this 
M easure by the unw earied Sollicitations o f  the Royal H avana Com pany: and they 
are not w ithout ju s t grounds o f  A pprehension that Duties m ay have been im posed 
upon their G oods, or dem anded upon their Return at E xportation” (K ennion to 
H alifax, London, 25 N ovem ber 1763, PRO, CO 117/1, fol. 297).
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a matter o f fact, Halifax reaffirmed “that the Spanish governor of the 
Havana has demanded a duty o f 9% in a quantity o f bullion which has 
been shipped there since the restitution of that place to the Spaniards”.25 
The merchants tried to force the Secretary of State to help them recover 
their property. But Halifax argued that the governor in Havana was right 
from the legal point of view, because they had not paid the legal Span­
ish duties. Although the British customs collector had alleged to guar­
antee their imposition, the merchants had paid only a so called com­
posición which was imposed on goods introduced accidently after the 
restitution on vessels without passports. The opinion of Halifax was 
confirmed by a statement o f the Spanish ambassador in London, the 
Marqués de Grimaldi, who pointed out that British merchants had to pay 
in case they had obtained winnings after the restitution when trade 
was no longer legal.26 That was obviously the case and in the end 
these goods worth 80,00027 could neither be sold nor re-exported. For 
most of the merchants who had tried to continue the trade with Havana 
after the departure o f the British troops it turned out to be a lost 
business.
25 H alifax to R ocheford, 13 M arch 1764 (PR O , SP 94/166, fol. 115-117). There is 
another m em orial added dated from  2 M arch 1764 and signed by further m er­
chants, som e o f  them  already m entioned in the m em orial dated 17 N ovem ber 1764 
quoted  in note 21): H. B igger; W ilkinson & W ilson; B oyle & Scott; R ichard T ids- 
wall; W alter and John Ewer; Sim on Fraser; H utchinson & M ure; R ichard A tkin­
son; R ichard A llnut; W. String; R ichard Osw ald & Co.; C harles O gelvie; H ayn- 
w ard & Rrose; M . Crichton; Bayne & A ddam s; T hom as Bell; C harles Ferguson; 
W illiam  Foger; S. D ickinson.
26 “ [...] han de pagar los caudales que se verificase haber adquirido los ingleses por 
negocio ú de otra m anera después que la P laza es de España y todo el territorio  de 
la isla; pero desde aquel instante cesó el tiem po hábil para traficar ellos en ella” 
(PRO , SP 94/166, fol. 136 (4 M arch 1764).
27 B eeston Long, m erchant o f  London, M em orial to the Earl o f  E grem ont, 20 Sep­
tem ber 1764 (PR O , SP 94/165, fol. 70-73).
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Reforms and further trade with Britain
The British left Havana in June 1763 and the Count of Riela became the 
new gobernador and capitán general of Cuba.28 Riela had a difficult 
task: to re-establish the authority of the Spanish Crown and to push 
forward the overdue reforms. But first he needed to raise money in 
order to finance the reconstruction of Havana’s fortifications and to 
strengthen the defence system. Surprisingly, he came to terms with the 
local elites and managed to impose higher taxes by promising political 
and economic concessions to the oligarchy. On 15 March 1764 Riela 
sent a noteworthy report to Madrid29 that attributed the economic 
underdevelopment and low royal revenues to the colonial government’s 
inefficiency, the commercial restrictions and the shortage of labour. 
Soon after, Havana’s oligarchy demanded several reforms such as the 
establishment o f an Audiencia (court o f appeal) in Cuba, the lowering 
o f taxes and opening of more ports (Bayamo, Trinidad, Santiago de 
Cuba and Puerto Principe) for trade with Spanish port towns like 
Barcelona, Málaga, La Coruña and Bilbao. They also argued that the 
interamerican trade with Louisiana, Yucatán, and Cartagena de Indias 
should be boosted. Direct contracts with the British slave traders in 
Jamaica were to be signed in order to stimulate the import of slaves as 
early as possible.30 The months of the prosperidad británica were 
glorified and exaggerated tremendously (Kuethe 1985: 66) in order to 
stress the necessity of these measures.31
28 AG I, SD leg. 1211.
29 AG I, SD leg. 1509.
30 AG I, SD leg. 2188.
31 Instead o f  the 1,000 m erchant ships m entioned by the petioners from  H avana and 
by  the jesu it T hom as B utler (“El núm ero de em barcaciones que entraron en todo 
este tiem po se hace increíble, por los apuntes de la contaduría se conocen que 
pasaron de mil: cuyo im porte á excepción de alguna azúcar que sacaron llevaban 
todo el d inero” (BN, CM Pérez Beato 26, p. 29), C hristelow  (1942: 314) estim ates 
the far m ore probable num ber o f  96. A t that tim e the port o f  H avana w as no t in 
conditions to  shelter a larger quantity  o f  vessels; furtherm ore, C uba’s production  
for export goods could not have experienced such a dram atic econom ic boom  in 
on ly  10 m onths (for the introduction o f  slaves during these m onths see note 46).
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There was no immediate response. The state of commerce was 
deplorable after the British left. Diego Joseph de Cosa, Secretary o f the 
Real Compañía, complained that the demand for slaves had not been 
satisfied by the asentista, Villanueva Pico from Cádiz and his agent in 
Havana, Joseph Uque Osorio.32
It was Riela who took the initiative. In reaction to de Cosa’s 
criticism, he terminated the contract with Villanueva Pico and Uque 
Osorio33 and conceded special licences to foreign merchants such as 
Cornelius Coppinger34 to at least guarantee Havana’s supply o f basic 
foodstuffs. Coppinger had come to Havana from Jamaica in 1762; he 
married the daughter of the fiscal de la Real Hacienda, the head o f the 
board o f Finance. In 1765 he obtained full citizenship.35 As the Cuban 
market did not turn out to be a commercial paradise for slave traders 
many merchants avoided Havana (Thomas 1971: 50). But others like 
Coppinger managed to provide the town with manufactured products 
and modem tools for the production of sugar instead of African slaves.
32 V illanueva P ico  w as in charge o f  the slave trade before and after the B ritish 
occupation. Cf. Cartas de la A dm inistración de la Real C om pañía de La Habana. 
D iego Joseph de Cosa, Secretario de la Junta de Com isión de la Real C om pañía de 
la Habana, 27 July 1763 (AN H, M dL 1435, fol. 2 vto).
33 C ontrato de V illanueva Pico, 30 N ovem ber 1763 (AN H, GSC 450/18574).
34 O ut o f  seven m erchants five were french (Fem ando Salvador, Juan Luis Caisergas, 
Juan Blanc, Juan M ontano, Pedro Barral), one was from  H avana (Joseph M ondo- 
tegui) and one w as B ritish (C ornelius Coppinger, “asentista para la provisión  de 
negros”). A ccording to this contract C oppinger in troduced 1,000 barrils o f  flour, 
1,500 barrils o f  salted pork and beef, 1,000 barrils o f  rice, 500 sm all barrils o f  
butter, 500 arrobas and 3,000 arrobas o f  com  (C ontratas adm itas por el Exm o Sr 
C onde de R iela para proveer el público en el año 1764 después del sitio, AN, AP 
99/53, fol. 85r-91r). C oppinger was still in business in 1787 (Testim onio de obli­
gación y contrato que D. C ornelio C oppinger y otros hicieron con José de A legría 
com o A dm inistrador de la Real C ía de esta Isla sobre proveerla  de negros esclavos, 
AN H, IGH 663/9).
35 AGI, SD leg. 1215 and 1254. C itizenship was conceded by the Consejo de Castilla 
in the Carta de naturaleza o f  23 M arch 1765. He w as a fairly  rich m an w ith a pos­
session o f  110,000 Pesos (“en créditos y bienes raíces”). O ther B ritish m erchants 
he had partnerships w ith in 1764 w ere J. W ilm ont, W. Fogot, P. Barrall, N. N aple- 
ton and J. Paplay & Co. from  Jam aica and the Spaniard J. Uque O sorio (AG I, SD 
leg. 1212-1213).
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After the initial boom in exports, importing goods from Jamaica and 
Britain to Cuba became much more lucrative (see Table 1).
Table 1: Trade of Great Britain with Havana






Source: W hitw orth (1 7 6 2 ,1: 89).
These merchants had managed to establish good relations with the new 
government in Havana and Coppinger in particular enjoyed the 
reputation o f a well-capitalized and reliable merchant. Like others, he 
retained merchandise in Havana’s warehouses when the British handed 
over the town. As Cuban buyers were mainly small producers or shop 
keepers, they had bought most articles on credit. Many fell into debt and 
problems arose between the British and local merchants such as delayed 
payments or total bankruptcy.36 Therefore it seemed easier to both
36 “Proclam ation about English and Spanish Traders: W hereas on the part o f  Several 
English M erchants and Traders in this city, H is E x .y  has received d iverse  C om ­
plaints setting forth , that m any Spaniards having agreed w ith said M erchants for 
parcel o f  Goods, have revolted from  the agreem ent afterwards, and denied the due 
C om pliance to the great Prejudice o f  the Sellers; w herefore it is hereby com m anded 
by H is Excellency that it be know n to those o f  both nations, that any bargain  d e ­
term ined & verified, m ust be absolutely and punctually  com ply ’d, w ith under- 
ly[ing] penalty  o f  being im prisoned, and there com pel’d to a strict observance: and 
m ust likew ise be answ erable for all losses arising from  the failure and that it should 
reach every  bodys know ledge, this w ill be  published by  beat o f  drum , and fixed 
up at the usual p laces” (W illiam  Keppel, H avana 6 April 1763, PRO , CO 117/1, 
fob 267). See also: “Proclam ation for the Spanish and English M erchants to settle 
their accounts: W hereas any delay in se ttling  all acounts, subsisting  betw een the 
English and Spanish M erchants, and others o f  this p lace, m ay be productive o f  bad 
consequences, H is E xcellency the G overnor hereby orders that all accounts and 
Engagem ents w hatsoever now depending m ay be properly  stated and the Balances 
settled  on o r before the 15th o f  this m onth and carried to M r B iggleston N otary  
Public in order to be lodged and registered in the Secretarys O ffice and it is hereby
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parties, the Spanish and the English, to come to terms in a different, 
more convenient way. In the treaty o f Paris it had been agreed that 
British merchants in Cuba -  fourteen at the time -  who were about to 
return to Britain should be given permission to remain in Havana for 
eighteen months and to re-export their goods from Cuba to England.37 
Merchants who acted as agents for absent British merchants were 
allowed to sell their goods in Havana. Riela assured the British 
authorities that the fourteen British merchants that had remained in 
Havana, would be under his personal protection: “Any other Merchant 
whose business shall oblige [him] to remain here some time will find 
me ready to favour them as far as may be required: And I shall always 
be care full that the provision made in the 19th article o f the Definitive 
Treaty shall be kept upon every of them”.38
Shortly thereafter, a voluminous register of British goods in Ha­
vana’s warehouses was compiled and the goods were to be sold in a 
public auction. This Inventario de Almacenes,39 although not complete, 
gives the only extant detailed information about merchandise imported 
by the British. The vast majority of the goods consisted o f spirits, most­
ly transported directly from Jamaica, and luxury articles from Britain’s 
booming textile industry both manufactured goods -  such as hats, 
stockings, gloves, shoes, laces and shirts -  and unfabricated cloth -  
mostly camlet, cotton, chintz, damask, taffeta and different sorts of 
linen. It was, however, the first time that such a wide assortment of 
goods was offered in Cuba. In addition, prices were relatively low and 
some of these articles had never arrived in greater quantities.40
further ordered that all future dealings after the said 15th day o f  M ay, shall be for 
ready M oney only, o r such securities as m ay be satisfactory to the parties and that 
w ill no t adm it o f  any further dispute” (W illiam  Keppel, Havana, 3 M ay 1763, 
PRO, CO 117/1, fol. 269).
37 For the original tex t o f  the  X lX th  article see A lm on (1763: 96-97) and Guiteras 
(116-117).
38 Riela to W illiam  Keppel, H avanna, 6 July 1763 (PRO , CO 117/1, fol. 287).
39 Sobre géneros de extranjeros, 23 N ovem ber 1763 (AN H, GSC 450/18754).
40 “ La introducción de generos ha  sido Cuantiosíssim a, de m odo que no es posible se 
consum an aqui en m uchos años, particularm ente lienzos, paños, L istados ordina­
rios, zarasas de todas calidades ([...]) siendo la intención continuar la ven ta  aquí, 
introducirlos en el resto de la Ysla, y  si pueden en la N ueva España, y en otras 
provincias de esta A m erica” . El Fiscal D on Juan López G am arra da cuenta de la
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One of the fourteen merchants who remained in Havana after the 
handover was Alexander Monroe who stayed there until 1766 as a 
private merchant with licences from both governments. Monroe became 
consul general in Madrid five years later and entered a partnership with 
John and Francis Baring.41 In 1765 he signed a contract with Riela to 
supply Havana with bricks for the reparation and amplification of the 
fortresses El Morro and La Punta and the construction o f La Cabaña. 
According to the contract 600,000 bricks were to be transported to Cuba 
from the ports of New York, Charleston and Pensacola.42
The following years saw the restructuring o f commerce and admin­
istration as well as the military and political reorganisation o f Cuba 
which turned the island into a testing ground for the Bourbons’ attempt 
to match British power in the colonies (Kuethe 1991: 22). Finally, 
Madrid introduced the first reform. Instead of establishing an appeal 
court,43 an intendente de guerra was installed in Havana who was in 
charge o f military affairs and the collection of revenues. The holder of 
this office was José Pablo Valiente, a peninsular-bom representative of 
Spanish interests in the colony.
As a first step towards reorganising the commercial links with the 
mother country a regular packetboat service between Havana and La 
Coruña was established in 1764. The commercial operations with the 
mother country were decentralized and the monopoly of Cádiz was 
replaced by a more open system of Cuban trade through other Spanish 
ports. With the introduction o f the so-called “free trade system” 
0comercio libre) in February 1765, Havana was permitted to trade 
directly with eight Spanish ports -  Barcelona, Alicante, Cartagena, Se-
In troducción de negros, y Generos hecha por los yngleses y  los depravados 
yntentos con que procuran venderlos todos, H avana 21 April 1763 (AGI, SD 2210, 
quoted  from  Aim es (1967: 33).
41 PR O , SP 94/189.
42 A s the arrival o f  the vessels w as delayed R iela refused to accept the m erchandise
and the bricks had to be returned to the N orth Am erican ports. M onroe sued R iela 
at the Suprem e C ourt in M adrid, but the verdict is not know n (M em orial Letter 
from  C olonel H ector M unro to the Duke o f  R ichm ond, concerning his bro ther 
A lexander M unro in H avana, 4 July 1766, PRO, SP 94/189).
43 T he Audiencia w as in Santo D om ingo and w as transferred to C uba in  1797 as a
consequence o f  the Haitian Revolution (Zeuske/M unford 1992: 92).
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villa, Málaga, La Coruña, Santander and Bilbao as well as with the 
Caribbean ports on Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Mar­
garita.44 Taxes on imported slaves were lowered, theac? valorem duties 
were fixed, and a royal decree allowed direct trade with Louisiana in 
March 1768. The next steps consisted in increasing sugar production 
and exporting hides as well as fighting contraband by lowering prices. 
These measures were the consequence of the reformatory spirit of the 
new governor who represented the politics of good will on behalf o f the 
Spanish Crown. They were also a reaction to Cuba’s demands at a 
moment when local discontent was at its peak after the British had left. 
Havana’s elite had experienced economic changes and had profited 
from them. Unlike the British and French planters, the Cubans had built 
up their plantation system by the use of internal capital and not that of 
the mercantile-manufacturing bourgeoisie o f the mother country. Their 
increased power entitled them to present what they considered their 
claims. It was the beginning of Cuba’s particular development within 
the Spanish colonial empire and o f a period which Hugh Thomas 
appropriately called Cuba’s first industrial revolution: an aristocratic, 
non-absentee revolution that was led by the local elite of planters and 
merchants. The formation o f this new and powerful oligarchy condi­
tioned Spain’s reaction. It was also inspired by the economic improve­
ments achieved during the British occupation and led to a much stronger 
cooperation with the creoles.
Slave trade
The increasing demand for African slaves required reorganisation of 
current practices, but the system did not change substantially. Until 
1789 individual contracts, special licences and the state-controlled 
companies were the only possible legal forms to obtain slaves, as there 
were no Spanish possesions in Africa until 1778.
After the concession o f the slave monopoly to the South Sea 
Company had been called off in 1739, neither the Real Compañía de la
44 Esquilache to Arriaga, AH N, Estado, leg. 2342.
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Habana nor individual Spanish asentistas could replicate the efficiency 
o f the British Company. From 1739 to 1761 less than 5,000 slaves were 
imported legally to Cuba (Donnan 1931, II: XLV).
The quantity of slaves increased during the British occupation, but 
former historiographical exaggerations need to be corrected. During the 
ten months the number of slaves introduced by Anglo-American traders 
was obviously much lower than the number implied by the Ricla-report 
or later stated by Aimes in his pioneering and influential “History of 
Slavery in Cuba”, first published in 1907.45 A maximum of between 
3,200 and 4,000 Africans46 were introduced, a number which did not 
even reach half the Jamaican rate, but it was a fair number compared to 
the modest amount o f 60,000 (an annual average o f 222) slaves im­
ported to Cuba during the entire colonial period up to 1762. The ex­
perience of the prosperidad británica brought a taste o f the advantages 
Britain’s “free trade” had to offer, such as quick transport of goods and 
reliable supply o f labour.
During the next two years after Havana had been returned to Spain, 
British merchants sold 5,037 slaves to the Real Compañía (Marrero 
1984, IX: 6). In 1765 the Count of Riela signed a contract with Cop- 
pinger, Wilmont & Fogot for the introduction of 7,000 Negroes and
14,000 barrils of flour.47 The King of Spain finally prohibited this trade 
“to prevent the English commerce from taking root in this area”.48 It
45 A im es (1967: 33) by  m istake gives the num ber o f  10,700 A fricans instead o f  1,700 
(T hom as 1971: 50). M cNeill (1985: 167) stresses that B ritish trade o f  slaves and 
goods during  the occupation has been overestim ated  in general: “ [...] rather than 
radically  increasing the volum e o f  trade, the occupation m erely m ade v isib le w hat 
had form erly been covert com m erce”. D uring the eighteenth century  at least 
tw o third o f  im ports entered C uba v ia  contraband. O ut o f  75,000 slaves that w ere 
brought to the Island betw een 1700 and 1765 only 16,000 w ere registered (M cNeill 
1985: 168-170).
46 O ffical sources give the num ber o f  3,262 (López to Arriaga, 21 April 1763, AGI, 
SD 2210). The entrance o f  these slaves w as legalized by  im posing the alcabala 
(4% ) on the price o f  each slave; see T ornero (1996: 35), T hom as (1971: 50) and 
M cN eill (1985: 167).
47 A N H , M dL  1435, fol. 37 and AN H, Reales C édulas 3/218 (17 April 1764): C arta 
aprobando la contrata de negros con la Cía.
48 “ [...] para evitar que el com ercio inglés se arraigue en estos parajes” (A ltarriba to
A rriaga, 4 Ju ly  1765, AGI, SD 2210).
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seems, thus, that the Cuban economy was in danger of becoming 
dependent on the British merchants and slave traders, for Cuba had a 
permanent demanded for labour. In the meantime, fourteen new sugar 
mills with a constantly growing production were established (Tornero 
1996: 37). When the Crown decided to contract with the Compañía 
gaditana de negros (Torres Ramírez 1973) from November 1766 to 
M arch 1771 for the introduction of 9.143 slaves,49 it was not even a 
compromise, for this company had bought these slaves from British 
merchant houses from London and Barbados through agents in Havana 
(Tornero 1996: 37). Juan de Miralles was the agent of the Cádiz-Com- 
pany in Havana and the Marqués de Enrile became its president. Enrile 
had excellent contacts with North America, Great Britain and Cádiz. 
Years later he became one o f the wealthiest landowners and merchants 
o f Havana. By then he had established a company with the British 
merchants Ludlow and Philip Alwood50 in Havana. They had partners in 
Charleston, London (Peyerin Hoof & Demiere) and Bordeaux (Figues 
& Sobrinos). In 1783 Enrile embarked on a business trip to Cádiz and 
Genoa to meet his brother who acted as his agent and dealt with other 
European commercial houses in London, Lisbon, Lyon and Marseille 
for the export of sugar, coffee and cocoa from Cuba, Venezuela (Cara­
cas) and Ecuador (Guayaquil). Enrile also imported silks and cloth from 
the Provence as well as olive oil and taffeta from Florence.51 The slave 
trader, merchant, landowner and nobleman Enrile had succeeded in 
creating his commercial network, because Spain finally loosened the 
trade restrictions on Cuba. It admitted exchange, especially with the
49 7,663 A fricans through H avana, 1,228 through Santiago, 142 through T rinidad and
110 th rough  Puerto Principe.
50 Fifteen years later A lw ood w ould becom e a key figure o f  H avana’s slave trade as 
the agent o f  the British C om pany B aker & Dawson. See note 60.
51 “ [...] m e parece que se podría  establecer un com ercio ventajoso con esta Isla
sacando estos frutos en derechura. Para los re tom os adem as de lo que a m i respecta 
siem pre tendré fondos en la H avana con que proveer y  seguram .te no faltaran 
ocasiones pa  hacerlo. Está inm ediato a dha ciudad de G enova el Puerto de M arsella 
de donde se puede sacar todos los frutos que produce la provenza y las sedas y 
tejidos de Leon, ([...]) aceytes y tafetanes de Florencia sedas y  otros tejidos según 
lo que V ds m e av isen” (Enrile to A lw ood and Ludlow, 10 July  1783, E gerton 
Papers 520, foi. 323-327). E nrile’s partners in H avana w ere in charge to organize 
the transport on N orth A m erican or British vessels v ia Jamaica.
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nearby, vast North American market through direct shipping or via 
Louisiana. Even when it became clear that the slave trade encouraged 
smuggling via New Orleans, the commerce on this route was restricted 
only temporarily.52 A new era began, when Spain finally permitted Cuba 
direct trade with neutral nations. The spectacular growth of Cuba’s 
sugar industry53 led to the amplification of the trade system: Between 
September 1773 and 1779 13,747 slaves were introduced from the 
North American market.54
Spanish slave traders imported slaves directly from African markets 
for the first time in 1778 after the acquisition of the islands o f Fernando 
Poo55 and Annobón.56 But in the long run the negreros failed because 
they lacked experience, vessels and crews.57 Subsequently foreign mer­
chants gained the contract when Spain entered into war with Britain.58 
Between 1781 and 1786 French slave traders were temporarily in 
charge of the slave trade to Cuba and special licences were given to 
locals, who were prominent members o f Havana’s oligarchy and who 
acted as front men for the foreigners in the Caribbean (Tornero 1996: 
40). In 1782 French slave traders from Paris, Le Havre and San Maló 
transported a total o f 16,750 slaves from Saint-Domingue to Cuba in 
cooperation with their partners.59
52 A N H , Reales C édulas 7 /1 8 8 (1 8  July 1775): Para que no se conceda licencia ni se 
perm ita  com erciar con negros a ningún particular a no ser por cuenta del asiento 
general, see also ANH, Reales C édulas 8/175 (8 M arch 1776): C arta relativa a la 
prohibición de transportar y vender negros por los vecinos de N ueva Orleans.
53 D uring  the 1750s arround 300 tons o f  sugar w ere exported per year; betw een 1764- 
69 the average w as 2000 tons and had increased to more than 10,000 tons per year 
at the beginning o f  the 1770s (Thom as 1971:61).
54 AG I, SD 2516.
55 In the G u lf  o f  Biafra, 35 km  o ff Cam erún.
56 In the G u lf o f  G uinea, 180 km  South W est o f  São Tom é (BL, A dd M s 13.984,
Papers re la ting  to Spanish Possesions in Am erica, “N oticias reflexiones para  la 
form ación de los estab lecim ien tos en las islas de A nnobon y  de Fem ando del Pó 
para  subsistir en ellas, y  para hacer el trafico de esclavos”, fol. 175-178).
57 T he French  slave trader Luis R ey in his informe o f  12 O ctober 1781 (AGI, IG 
2820).
58 AN H, Reales Cédulas 17/40 (16 M arch 1781): C arta am pliando a las colonias neu ­
trales la com pra de negros por el com ercio español m ientras dure la pres.te guerra.
59 Reales C édulas 17/116 (24 O ctober 1781): C arta autorizando al Sr. Luis Rey para
conducir negros bozales de la costa de G uinea a la Havana. Luis R ey from  Saint 
D om ingue had branches in M adrid and Cádiz and w as also an advisor to the
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After the French interlude the asiento was given to Baker & 
Dawson60 from Liverpool whose agent in Havana, Philip Alwood,61
Spanish C row n concerning m atters o f  slave trade [see note 56]; o ther French 
m erchants w ere B om balle D elepinay, José Laserra, Leconteul and C om pany o f  
Pais, R om berg o f  Ghent, C hauvel and Sons o f  Le Havre, M arion o f  San M aló; their 
partners in H avana w ere Francisco de Sierra, Juan López, M iguel A ntonio de 
H errera, Tom ás D om ingo de Sotolongo, Francisco de Guerra, José Gato, José 
Zequeira, Javier de M atienzo, M arqués del Real A grado, M arqués de Enrile, 
E useb io  de la Luz, M arquesa V iuda de C ardenas de M onte H erm oso, V icente 
E spón and Fem ando de Tolosa (AN H, Reales C édulas, leg. 18-20).
60 AN H, Reales C édulas 3/218 (27 M arch 1786): C arta acom pañando copia de la con­
trata  con la casa de B acker y Daw son para proveer de negros la Isla de C uba y  la 
p rovincia  de Caracas; Reales Cédulas 21/153 (29 M arch 1786): C arta para  que se 
vendan todas las cargazones de negros que entran en p laza a consecuencia  de  la 
co n tra ta  con la casa inglesa de B acker y D awson; Reales C édulas 22/35 (20 July  
1786): C arta sobre abono de im porte de los negros que con arreglo a la contrata de 
B acker y  D awson se reciban en Cuba, Puerto Rico y Santo D om ingo; Reales C édu­
las 22/98 (7 O ctober 1786): C arta relacionada con la d istribución  de la arm azón 
p rim era  de negros de la contrata de B acker y D awson; Reales C édulas 22 /112 
(8.11.1786): C arta declarando libres de derechos los negros que se introduzcan por 
la contrata de B acker y D awson; Reales C édulas 23/63 (31 .8 .1787): C arta sobre 
concesión  de prórroga de seis m eses a los S.res B acker y Daw son para la in tro ­
ducción de negros en la Isla de Cuba; Reales Cédulas 24/1 (10 M ay 1788): C arta 
autorizando a los S .res B acker y Daw son para im portar negros fuera de su contrata.
61 A lw ood, like C oppinger, had been conceded a carta de naturaleza. He w as p ro ­
tected by  the governor and well acquainted w ith Enrile; this friendship  brought him  
com m ercial advantages as well as the envy o f  the local m erchants and landow ners 
w hich nearly  cost him  his perm it o f  residence. On 12 A ugust 1788 M erchant M a­
nuel de Zulueta, a resident o f  H avana, w rote in the nam e o f  o ther hacendados a 
pro test letter to the C row n because A lw ood’s contract w as about to  be prolonged: 
“H abiendo hecho la casa inglesa B aker y Dawson de Liverpool una representación 
proponiendo celebrar una contrata para introducir negras en la isla de C uba por 
espacio de seis u ocho años, exponen que se deja ver claram ente la coligación y 
am istad del apoderado de la casa inglesa con el G obernador de La H abana y 
resultando de ella un perjuicio a toda la nación y un dao irreparable al com ercio i 
a la navegación, hacendados y  m enestrales, suplican se d igne despreciar la referida 
contrata y el acuerdo celebrado en su virtud, declarando se haga este com ercio por 
nacionales y  en naves españolas y  si esto no pudiese conseguirse  perm itir la 
libertad de hacerlo  a todas las naciones que quieran com o se verifica en las dem ás 
colonias extranjeras, a fin de que con la concurrencia se introduzcan la abundancia 
y por consiguiente las ventajas del precio y de elección, por ser éste el único m edio 
de evitar todos los inconvenientes del m onopolio” (AGI, SD 1249) quoted  from  
T ornero  (1996: 43). A lw ood answered im m ediately in view  o f  the m enacing
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achieved a solid cooperation with the Governor Ezpeleta and his father- 
in-law Enrile, former president o f the Compañía gaditana. Baker & 
Dawson imported 5,233 slaves between July 1786 and April 1789 
(Tornero 1996: 41). After the protests of the Hispanic merchants and 
planters against this monopoly contract the Spanish Crown signed the 
Royal Decree o f 28 February 1789 opening the new era of “free slave 
trade”.62 From the end of the English occupation to 1789, approximately
41,000 slaves had been transported to Cuba. Even during the following 
years, when the United States became Cuba’s most important trading 
partner, Britain maintained its position as the island’s main supplier of 
slaves (Tornero 1996: 64-65).
Economic institutions, tecnical innovations and mental change
Cuba’s transition from a colony of entry and provisioning to a sugar 
giant involved drastic changes in political, administrative and economic 
organisation and in social life in general. The significance o f the 
gobernador increased for he had to create the political framework for 
the economic transition. But new institutions were also needed that
expulsion and underlined his m erits in trade w ith C uba (E xpediente prom ovido por 
Dn. Felipe A lw ood solicitando que esta corporación represente a S.M . recom en­
dándole para que no se le expulse de esta Isla, por ser extranjero, 8 Julio  1795: “El 
que representa, aunque extrangero , ha  procurado contribuir siem pre con sus p ro­
porciones y facultades al m ayor adelanto y prosperidad de estos habitadores ya  con 
la num erosa  in toducción de negros ya facilitando a sus H acendados. A m as de esto, 
se h a  em peñado en traer de la Y sla  de Jam ayca, a rbo les de frutos exquisitos y 
particulares de la Y ndia  O riental conducidos a aquella  [=Jam aica] con dem asiado 
costo por el G obierno Británico, porque siem pre ha dado las m ás relevantes 
pruevas de su particular afecto a la Nación Española, con especialidad a los vecinos 
y  m oradores de esta Ysla, confiándoles quantiosos caudales para su fom ento” 
(A N H , R eales C édulas 201/8913).
62 A N H , Reales C édulas 24/165 (28 February 1789): C oncediendo libertad para  el 
com ercio de negros con las islas de Cuba, Santo D om ingo, Puerto Rico y  p rovincia  
de Caracas; see also Reales C édulas 27/161 (24 N ovem ber 1791): Concediendo 
libertad al com ercio de negros con los v irreinatos de Santa Fe, Buenos A ires, C ara­
cas, Islas de Santo D om ingo, C uba y Puerto Rico a  españoles y extranjeros bajo las 
reglas que expresa.
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would regulate and coordinate agriculture and trade. Production and 
export had to be connected. Spain could only offer the transfer of its 
own conservative trade boards and Cubans questioned the usefulness of 
the copy in light o f the limited success of the original. The following 
years saw the establishment of new commercial institutions following 
the example o f both Spanish and foreign trade centers in order to 
modernize the economy and especially facilitate the interchange with 
neutral ports.
The Real Consulado de Agricultura y  Comercio, founded in 1795, 
was a body representing the political leaders and the Cuban commercial 
elite. Current matters of commerce and agriculture were discussed; 
especially the slave trade with foreign partners was controlled63 in 
order to improve the local economy and weaken the monopoly o f Cádiz 
as well as the competition from Mexico.64 In 1794 Francisco Arango y 
Parreño, Cuba’s mastermind of economic progress, travelled to Britain, 
Portugal and Jamaica in order to investigate and copy methods and 
practices of international sugar production and sale.65 He returned from 
England with the idea of an autonomous institution that would be 
controlled by the producers of sugar (Moreno Fraginals 1978, I: 106). 
Thus, a Junta de Fomento was created and officially subordinated to the 
Real Consulado. The Junta became a sort of a creole ministery and 
initiated the administrative shift towards monoculture in Cuba.
63 “ [...] los dos cónsules han de ser o haver sido com erciantes de gran reputación y 
concepto y de los conciliarios havrá cinco de la clase de agricultores recom en­
dables y quatro de la de com erciantes de m érito a fin de que nunca quede p repon­
derante en la Junta una de las dos clases porque en un país agricu lto r son insepa­
rables los intereses de la agricultura y del com ercio” (R eglam ento  para el esta­
blecim iento del Consulado, 30 January 1792, BN, CM  Pérez Beato No. 802).
64 E xpediente relativo a la oposición profesada por el C onsulado de V eracruz á todo 
cuanto se ha  obrado por este de La H abana tanto sobre el com ercio con neutrales 
com o sobre la rem isión de caudales y  fondos preciosos, 19 M arch 1800 (AN H, RC 
72/2788).
65 AN H, RC 92/3923 (30 Septem ber 1795): Expediente sobre las noticias com uni­
cadas por el Sindico Don Francisco A rango y  Parreño, adquiridas en el viage por 
encargo de S.M . ha hecho a Inglaterra, Portugal, Barbada [sie] y  Jam ayca; RC 
93/3924 (28 O ctober 1795): Expediente relativo a las noticias adquiridas por el Sr 
Sindico de este cuerpo [Junta de Fom ento] en Inglaterra y  Jam ayca, sobre refinerías 
de azúcar.
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In view of the growing export sector new warehouses were built,66 
an Escuela de Pilotos for the formation of professional harbour pilots 
was opened in 1797 and in 1800 the first insurance company was 
founded.67 Following the examples of London, Amsterdam, Hamburg 
and towns in Germany and France, an auction and coinage house as 
well as a stock exchange were opened during the following years.68
Some technical innovations were introduced in the sugar sector, but 
the system of manufacture did not alter substantially (Moreno Fraginals 
1978,1: 74). Agustín de Batancourt was moved from London to Cuba 
and appointed Director del Gabinete de Máquinas. But this board’s 
attempt to promote steam power in place of animal power did not suc­
ceed. Transport and communication were improved mainly in the 
Havana area especially with the construction of the Güines Canal with 
elementary technical help from England.69
Education was extended with the foundation o f the Instituto de 
Ciencias Exactas y  Naturales where English and French were taught 
(Tornero 1996: 186). Nevertheless, rich families preferred to send their 
children to schools in the United States. Spain disapproved of such 
practise as maintaining the old system garanteed the mother country’s 
political control against liberal and revolutionary influences.
66 A N H , RC 72/2787 (30 O ctober 1799): Expediente sobre prom over el aum ento de 
alm acenes en esta plaza.
67 A N H , R C  72/2790 (28 M ay 1800): Expediente sobre la im portancia de  sostener en 
esta  p laza la cía  de seguros. In 1814 L lo y d ’s o f  L ondon tried to open a branch in 
Havana. See: RC 201/8922 (27 October 1814): Expediente sobre la tentativa de la 
A sociación de Seguros M arítim os de L loyd’s en Londres para  tener aquí un agente 
reconocido po r el C onsulado.
68 A N H , R C  72/2783 (15 July  1801): E xpediente prom ovido por D. A gustín R odrí­
guez y Dn. Santiago D rake sobre establecim iento de una venduta en esta plaza. 
D rake w as agent for the B ritish banker K leinw ort (E ly  1963: 343). The perm ission 
to open a venduta was conceded in 1805: R eglam ento para  gobierno de dos A lm o­
nedas M ercantiles o sean V endutas establecidas en esta ciudad. La H abana 1805, 
Im prenta de la C apitanía General; RC 73/2811 (1804-1809): Expediente relativo al 
establecim iento de una lonja m ercantil.
69 A N H , R ealengos 76/1 (1796-98): D ocum entos relacionados con la com isión que le 
fue confinada a Sr C onde de M opox y  de Jaruco sobre el descubrim iento de terre­
nos; BN, CM  Folleto 305/3 (1796-1802): D ocum entos relativos a la expedición del 
C onde de M opox a la Isla de Cuba.
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In the decades after the British occupation a change of mentality 
within Havana’s oligarchy took place. The old concept o f the patria 
chica waned in favour of a new feeling of hispanidad due to the 
growing political links with Spain. In spite of the positive experience 
with the British trade system, England was considered the main enemy 
because of her military strength and menacing presence in the Carib­
bean. It was not until the sugar revolution that a mental shift occurred. 
The need for commercial interchange brought a new orientation towards 
the North Atlantic Anglo-American world. A new feeling o f cuba- 
nidad arose and the colonial past was suddenly addressed as the 
tiempos prim itivos  (Arango y Parreño 1952, II: 6), whereas the 
beginning o f Cuban history was set in 1762-63.70 At the same time the 
Catholic Church lost much of its former influence due to the 
increasingly secularized planter class. With the introduction of steam 
power and railroads, the presence of the Church on the plantations 
vanished (Moreno Fraginals 1978, I: 115-116; 126). The Junta de 
Fomento succeeded in abolishing holidays on the sugar plantations and 
the payment o f the tithe; chaplains were allowed to say mass on big 
plantations and cemeteries were integrated on the premises.71
70 “A lexem os nuestra consideración de aquellos oscuros días que corrieron desde su 
descubrim iento hasta el afio 1763 y  fíxandola en el período que ha seguido desde 
entonces hasta el presente, conocerem os el efecto de las providencias que adoptó 
nuestra España para m ejorar la suerte de estos vasallos” (Junta de Fom ento, 
25 Septem ber 1798, ANH, RC 93/3938).
71 ANH, RC 93/3938 (25 Septem ber 1798): Expediente sobre abolición de días festi­
vos en fom ento de las labores del cam po y sobre facultar a los capellanes de los 
Ingenios para que puedan decir M isa en ellos aun en los dias exceptuados, adm i­
nistrar los sacram entos y sepultar los cadáveres en cementerios hechos al proposito; 
ANH, RC 101/4330 (8 April 1796): Expediente sobre exim ir del pago de diezm os 
á los prim eros ingenios que se establezcan según el m étodo extranjero. Sym pto­
m atically, the nam es given to planatations and sugar m ills changed during these 
years. New installations instead o f  “Purísim a”, “C oncepción” or” Santísim a T rin i­
dad” w ere nam ed “Buen Suceso”, “A nfititre” or “ A m istad” (M oreno Fraginals 
1 9 7 8 ,1: 115).
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Conclusion
Although significant commercial interrelations were established after 
the the capture of Havana, this event did not signify Cuba’s complete 
incorporation into the transatlantic trade system that connected North 
America, the Caribbean and Great Britain. Havana was returned to 
Spain after a mere ten months and legal trade on a large scale was in­
terrupted immediately afterwards. The introduction o f slaves during the 
occupation was noteworthy and much higher than in the previous 
decades, but Cuba’s economic structure did not change fundamentally. 
The success o f the British and North American merchants was based on 
the productivity, capital and spending power in Cuba that were created 
by the early Bourbon reforms in the decades before the occupation. The 
growth of Cuba’s domestic economy was the result o f the increased 
export trade to Spain and the promotion of sugar after the cultivation 
o f tobacco had been monopolized. “The English did nothing that the 
Cubans were not already doing before they arrived on the scene” 
(Knight 1970: 7). These achievements together with the experience of 
joining the North Atlantic trade system temporarily during the British 
time and the subsequent reforms of Charles III. were the conditions 
Cuba’s radical transformation into a plantation society.
The history o f Cuba did not begin in 1762. Havana’s oligarchy grew 
constantly during the early colonial period and became a considerable 
power in economic and political life in the course of the eighteenth 
century (Tornero 1996: 12). Economic diversification and the integra­
tion into international commerce, albeit illegal, were parallel processes 
and intensified strongly after the British occupation. The slave trade 
boomed and British merchants who remained in Havana after the end of 
the ocupation helped re-establish commercial activities. The formerly 
gradual process towards monoculture was now accelerated. The main 
consequence was underdevelopment and growing dependency on for­
eign merchants and markets. This dependency was complete by the end 
o f the century. The trade with North America determined the volume of 
Cuba’s output. Its beginning can be traced back to the British occupa­
tion o f Havana. Therefore, in contrast to the Anglo-Cuban trade, the 
short period of 1762/63 can be considered as a turning point in the
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relations between North American entrepreneurs and Cuban creole 
planters.
During the process in which the colonies were integrated into world 
trade,72 the Anglo-American entrepreneurs sought the cooperation of the 
economically inferior and rather inexperienced Cuban elites which 
depended on slaves and credit funds provided by the Anglo-American 
entrepreneurs. Neither was a national network of investments shaped 
nor an expansion o f a diversified production achieved. Consequently 
Cuba did not engender a bourgeoisie nor an interior market. Her growth 
depended on the North Atlantic trade circuits. The Cuban landowner 
sought to increase his immediate production by importing slaves and 
subordinated himself to the slave trader and merchant. The import 
system conditioned the outflow of Cuban exports and capital towards 
America and England. Historians such as Tornero (1996: 58; 145) have 
applied the theory o f dependence to Cuba. Nevertheless, two results of 
the Bourbon Reforms should be stressed: on the one hand, they helped 
to accelerate ongoing processes, on the other hand, they managed to 
maintain Spanish political control over Cuba. Spain, without industry, 
banks or a commercial network, could neither offer processing indus­
tries nor redistribution, but by transforming Cuba into a plantation 
society, Spain increased the power and wealth o f the Cuban planter 
class, thus winning its loyalty, the foundation for a Cuba “semper 
fidel”.73 Neither Great Britain nor the United States realized further 
plans o f territorial expansion. Politics had changed since the era of
72 See for exam ple H arlow  (1 9 5 2 ,1: 166) and W allerstein (1986, II: 258) w ho inter­
prete the end o f  the Seven Y ears W ar as the “w atershed” from  m ercantilism  to 
industrial capitalism  under B ritish rule. As a m atter o f  fact, the significance o f  that 
period lies in the drastic changes that occurred as a  result o f  dem ographic changes, 
increase o f  p roductiv ity  and com m ercial activity, the extension tow ards colonial 
m arkets and concentration o f  benefits in the hands o f  the new  priv ileged entre­
preneurial class that m anaged to profit from  technical innovations in the revolu­
tionary  era betw een 1760 and 1815. As Pierre V ilar (1982) in his m onum ental 
H istory  o f  C atalonia stresses: “L ’activité com m erciale sans cesse élargie, en 
ineraction constante avec l ’exploitation coloniale m ieux assurée, la hausse des prix 
généralisée, en interaction constante avec l ’extraction de I’argent à m eilleur marché 
et avec la m ultiplication de signes m onétaires nouveaux le jeu  m ém e [...]” (V ilar 
1982, II: 9).
73 T his play  on w ords has been taken from  M agarr (1988).
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mercantilism, and military force was not seen as absolutely necessary to 
obtain influence and supremacy. While in the early eighteenth century 
pirates and the admirals of the Royal Navy agressively represented 
British interests in the Spanish colonial empire, a new type of protag­
onist appeared on the scene and silently took their turn: It was the 
merchant who did business independently of political circumstances -  
even with Cuba, that remained a Spanish colony.
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